Germany is often described as a model of European stability: economically powerful, administratively competent and a self-proclaimed leader in humanitarian values. However, their migration system tells a different story. Since Merkel’s “Wir schaffen das” declaration in 2015, Germany has moved from openness to restriction, from leadership to hesitation, revealing deeper institutional, strategic and political cracks. Reports from the World Bank and the Heinrich Böll Foundation emphasise the need for decentralised flexibility, stakeholder coordination and long-term planning, but these findings go largely unnoticed. This contradiction between external image and internal reality raises a fundamental question:

Why has Germany, despite its capabilities and experience, failed to lead migration in a coherent and sustainable way?

Author: Nina Wojnar

From ‘Wir schaffen das’ to burnout 

Chancellor Angela Merkel’s iconic statement ‘Wir schaffen das’ (‘We can do it’) in 2015 was a bold humanitarian gesture, signalling Germany’s intention to take the initiative at the height of the European refugee crisis. At a time when thousands of asylum seekers were arriving at the EU’s external borders every day, especially in Greece and Italy, Merkel’s statement represented a break with the uncertainty prevailing in most European countries. It had enormous symbolic power both at home and abroad, positioning Germany as a moral leader amid the fragmented EU response. Nevertheless, this political message quickly clashed with the practical realities of a bureaucratic system that was not prepared for rapid mass adoption. 

Within a few months, the influx of around 890,000 asylum seekers revealed deep institutional tensions. Studies estimate that after 2015, social unrest related to immigration increased by 22%, especially in the eastern federal states. This led to a rise in support for the anti-immigration party Alternative for Germany (AfD), an early sign that the honeymoon period was coming to an end.

What began as a narrative of unity and compassion quickly changed. High-profile security incidents, such as the New Year’s Eve attacks in Cologne, and growing expectations on overburdened social welfare systems fuelled public anxiety. By 2017, the mainstream discussion had shifted towards deterring immigrants, as evidenced by budget proposals to tighten border controls and deportation processes. 

The AfD has gained popularity by capitalising on this fatigue, with polls indicating that nearly a quarter of Germans support radical change. Friedrich Merz, the current leader of the CDU, further codified this shift: ‘Germany… has clearly failed’ to cope with the influx of refugees and must now move to assertive migration control.

Institutional overload

The German administration may look solid on paper, but it has proven incapable of managing large-scale migration. It has been hampered by rigid procedures, fragmented responsibilities and recurring crises in crucial agencies. The key institution for migration policy, The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), has struggled to keep up with demand. The number of pending asylum applications rose sharply after 2015, even though the number of staff at the agency quadrupled by mid-2016. 

Persistent delays in processing applications, combined with a high-profile scandal in 2018 that led to the re-examination of around 18,000 asylum decisions, revealed both inadequate staff training and the risk of corruption. Despite a formal increase in staff numbers, oversight reports pointed to duplication of work, poor communication between agencies, and inefficient digital systems. There was even a lack of analysis of known risks in case management systems until external auditors forced them to do so.

Germany’s federal structure exacerbates these challenges. While the BAMF sets asylum standards, the federal states (Länder) and municipalities manage reception and initial accommodation. In 2015, this led to chaotic results: some federal states ran out of shelter space and had to resort to emergency camps. Meanwhile, larger city-states such as Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg bore a disproportionate burden due to high housing costs and limited urban space. 

The ‘campification’ of refugee accommodation is a clear sign of institutional overload. The term refers to the shift from decentralised, community-based housing to large-scale temporary facilities that prioritise control and containment over integration. A comparative study conducted by Schammann and Gluns (2017) for Comparative Migration Studies describes in detail how Berlin transitioned from settling refugees in apartments before 2015 to establishing over 100 crisis centres by 2016. Reception camps and hastily converted industrial halls were designated for the temporary detention of asylum seekers for several months. This model prioritised isolation over integration and reflected a reactive, minimalist approach to accommodation.

A 2025 Reuters report highlighted that nearly 40% of municipalities now describe their refugee situation as critical. Public frustration has been mounting across the country, and protests immediately erupted in places such as Rott am Inn when plans emerged to house 300 migrants in a disused factory. 

These institutional failures are not isolated. A 2023 World Bank study found that German migration management lacked integrated feedback loops. Regions were unable to communicate their needs quickly, and the BAMF did not significantly adjust its decision-making pace or resource allocation to meet new challenges. Administrative structures remained rigid, reactive, and isolated rather than flexible.

Leadership gap

While Germany has shown strong leadership on long-term challenges such as the energy transition, its approach to migration reveals a striking lack of strategic coordination. It is a conspicuous lack of stakeholder engagement, visionary planning and inclusive structures that characterise resilient governance.

This pattern reflects what the public policy literature describes as a failure of multi-level governance, in which responsibilities are distributed among national, regional and local actors without effective vertical coordination. Migration, as a policy domain that transcends the legal, social and economic spheres, fits the definition of a “wicked problem” that has no simple solutions and requires adaptive, cross-sectoral responses. 

The German centralised but fragmented approach does not take this complexity into account. Moreover, in the context of the EU, Germany’s changing position undermines its normative leadership, a concept associated with states that consistently promote values such as human rights and solidarity through both rhetoric and institutional coherence.

Germany’s great strength in managing complex policies such as the Energiewende lies in the broad stakeholder engagement. It is the cooperation between federal ministries, federal states, municipalities, industry representatives, trade unions and environmental NGOs that has led to success. A key example is the cross-sectoral stakeholder committee on coal phase-out, which has achieved a sustainable consensus by 2038 through structured cooperation at different levels of government and civil society.

In contrast, migration governance remains highly isolated. A recent FEPS policy report noted that there are ‘clear objectives’ on migration. However, ‘their implementation remains difficult’ due to poor stakeholder integration. Civil society organisations or municipalities involved in direct support to refugees rarely play a significant role in policy-making. Agencies act top-down as delivery-only entities that are completely disconnected from expertise on the ground.

Germany is at the forefront of policy areas where long-term thinking dominates. This is evidenced by the German Climate Action Plan 2050, which builds a framework over decades and fosters iterative adaptation through annual reviews, regional councils and ministerial accountability. The key to its success has been institutionalised stakeholder feedback loops, allowing policy to evolve with social and economic realities, something that is particularly lacking in migration governance. 

As opposed, migration policy remains crisis-based and reactive. Between 2022 and 2024, Germany has moved from gesture-based openness to secure border controls, with little planning for socio-economic integration, housing or labour demand beyond populist cycles. Without a far-reaching migration framework, German policy is vulnerable to short-term shocks.

Sustainable management recognises migrants as co-creation partners, a principle present in successful renewable energy projects and social innovation models. For example, the EU’s Fair Transition Mechanism enables local workers in energy regions such as the Ruhr to shape policy outcomes. 

Migration policy, on the other hand, has no structure for co-design. ESSIER policies, such as German-funded skills partnerships, can summon the private sector and government. But they do not convene migrant representatives themselves, which weakens the legitimacy and limits the reach of integration solutions. Local actors who witness the daily realities of migration are not embedded in national planning processes.

The contrast could not be more stark: where Germany is building an inclusive, horizontal, multilateral framework for sustainable development, its migration apparatus remains fragmented, reactive and driven by political narratives rather than national strategy. The leadership that drove the Energiewende is remarkably absent in migration, and until it is replicated, Germany will struggle for leadership in any lasting sense.

Perception vs. Practice: Image vs. Reality

Germany presents itself as a “responsible leader” on migration, a narrative deeply rooted in its 2015 response under Chancellor Angela Merkel. However, actions taken since then reveal a persistent dissonance between image and practice, undermining both national credibility and EU coherence.

Merkel’s decision to suspend the Dublin Regulation and accept more than one million refugees has gained global recognition, temporarily transforming Germany and Europe into confident moral entities. German political scientists have noted that such decisions were aimed at preserving Germany’s “positive national image” in the face of intense international scrutiny. The leadership’s rhetoric was part of the EU’s broader ambitions to assert normative authority, as well as to promote human rights at home and abroad.

Despite this initial openness, Germany soon made sharp changes to its policy. Interior Minister Horst Seehofer’s much-publicised dispute with Merkel over asylum in 2018 illustrated the growing tensions in domestic politics and political paralysis. More recently, under Scholz, Germany reintroduced systematic border controls, suspended family reunification and promoted offshore asylum processing with EU partners.

These unilateral measures, while politically defensible at home, have damaged the EU’s credibility. European asylum coordination depends on consistent implementation at national level. Therefore, changes in German policy, from the Dublin opt-out to the border change, have contributed to wider fragmentation at EU level and delays in reforming the common framework. Critics warn that systematic border controls threaten the Schengen system and could normalise national discretion over European cohesion. Poland, Hungary and Austria have applauded the change made by Germany, while pro-European voices fear it could destroy the liberal-democratic foundations of the Union.

Research has consistently shown that credibility is the cornerstone of normative leadership. Germany’s vacillating stance on migration alternates between humanitarian openness and secure retreat. This has weakened their voice at EU summits, complicating efforts for a unified asylum and migration framework. The 2022 Reconnect document argues that such vacillation undermines both the EU’s internal democratic legitimacy and global moral stance.

Germany’s record on migration reveals a painful truth: leadership without coherent action is hollow. It can be argued that when Germany acts rashly, it undermines not only its own moral standing, but also the resilience and unity of the EU.

Missed Strategic Framing: Crisis, Not Reality

Germany continues to treat migration as a series of sudden episodes. They present each influx as a crisis to be contained, rather than as part of a long-term demographic and economic strategy. This crisis mindset has stifled sustainable reforms and muddled public discourse.

Public discourse in Germany often uses the language of “waves” and “crises”. Political scientists who pay attention to framing effects argue that such terminology perpetuates a narrative of threat, crowding out more productive interpretations that might emphasise demographic recovery or economic contribution. By anchoring public sentiment in fear and unpredictability, policy discussions remain reactive – focused on border controls and short-term deterrence rather than migration as a structural opportunity.

Germany is facing a serious demographic crisis: an ageing population, low birth rates and a shrinking workforce. The 2023 spatial microsimulation study highlights that regional population projections and workforce vitality are highly sensitive to assumptions about migration. Interestingly, policymakers rarely refer to these projections in debates on migration. Instead, the focus is on political emergency response. This leaves little room for evidence-based planning that aligns migration with labour market and education needs.

A recent comparative study of refugee reception frameworks shows that Germany has largely prioritised security and cultural frameworks. Economic opportunities have been underestimated, despite their potential to shift policy towards integration and skills matching. Although labour market shortages are acute, experts estimate that Germany needs around 400,000 arrivals a year to stabilise its workforce. Yet the public conversation remains mired in talk of crisis rather than strategic investment.

This crisis approach prevents the development of long-term migration strategies that integrate demographic planning, education, housing and labour needs. Bridging initiatives such as “skills partnerships” suffer from insufficient policy support and a lack of coordination between federal agencies, employers and vocational institutions.

Countries with coherent strategies, such as Canada or Sweden, anchor migration in the current nation-building framework. Unlike Germany, they are also investing in public communication strategies that present migration as an economic necessity and cultural enrichment, rather than just a control issue or crisis situation. These sporadic efforts undermine the country’s ability to integrate newcomers, followed by a sudden policy reversal when public opinion changes.

By constantly portraying migration as an acute crisis, Germany is locking itself into a reactive cycle. In doing so, they undermine sustainable reforms that could ensure demographic stability, economic gains and social resilience. Shifting to a strategic framework, i.e. treating migration as a structural reality, remains the missing element of a truly coherent policy.

What Now for German Migration Policy?

Germany’s experience shows that even strong, resource-rich democracies can fail when migration policy emphasises short-term control over long-term strategy. Each crisis previously promised moral leadership, but revealed a deeper institutional weakness: the BAMF was overstretched, federal coordination fragmented and capabilities disconnected from a credible vision.

Moreover, superficial, reactive policymaking not only fails administratively but also undermines public trust. Political science research shows that when citizens perceive their leaders as incompetent or chaotic, trust in institutions declines. As a result, they make voters vulnerable to the polarising rhetoric of populists and disrupt social cohesion. In Germany, migrants may arrive but the lack of strategic framing and coherent planning means that citizens ultimately “pay” the price through service burden, increased fears and democratic disillusionment.

The German case shows that resilience lies in systems built for complexity: policies that balance humanitarian values, economic planning and demographic realities. Short-termism and superficial solutions may buy political time, but they come at a higher cost, undermine public trust and raise the future price of poor migration management.

In the face of rising social tensions, ongoing demographic changes and new migration pressures, the question remains open: 

Will Germany finally decide on a coherent, long-term migration strategy or will it continue to react in an ad hoc manner and allow political calculations to obscure the structural needs of the state?

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